A de…ning feature of transition economies is the expansion of the private sector. Motivated by the observation that new enterprises in transition economies seem to have a strong preference for recruiting young people, this paper studies intergenerational redistribution following from market reforms that stimulate private sector activity and …rm creation. We implement a theoretical model and …nd that in some cases more than half of the current working age population may be made worse o¤ by an increase in entrepreneurial capacity. This may help explain why market reforms have been voted down despite their long-run bene…ts.
Introduction
The introduction of free markets and extensions of property rights have provided the opportunity for greater entrepreneurial activity in former Soviet-type societies. In fact, the role of the private sector has already increased signi…-cantly. For example, Fischer and Sahay (2001) report evidence that the private sector share of GDP in transition economies has grown, on average, from about 25 percent in 1989-94 to about 50 percent in 1995-97. Although other factors may have contributed to the high output growth rates observed in most transition economies in recent years, advances in macroeconomic performance have undoubtedly been associated with higher rates of investment in new knowledge, skills and work processes within the private sector.
The growth-enhancing e¤ects of market-oriented reforms would normally be regarded as desirable and therefore be welcomed by the general public. It is, however, widely believed that the transition process has had adverse distributional e¤ects. This perception is broadly supported by available evidence on the changes in the individual distribution of incomes and consumption possibilities in transition economies. Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that the transition process has implied a marked increase in inequality and poverty; see, e.g., Aghion and Commander (1999) .
1 Thus, the fact that the reform process has been held back in most transition economies may be given a political economy interpretation: too many groups in society have not bene…ted from the reforms and have therefore voted against them. This paper studies distributional aspects associated with economic transition. However, rather than approaching this from the perspective of di¤erent socioeconomic groups ("rich vs. poor"), our focus is on the intergenerational aspects ("young vs. old"). This dimension has, to our knowledge, been subject of little academic attention so far. Our motivation for addressing this issue is mainly based on the following two characteristics of the transition process: First, new enterprises have a strong preference for recruiting young people, and, second, new enterprises pay better salaries than old enterprises. Antila and Ylöstalo (1999) present detailed evidence of both stylized facts from the Baltic states in 1998: In Lithuania, for example, of those aged 30 and below, 44 percent worked in new enterprises, whereas this was only the case 17 percent of those aged 50 and above. Similarly, in Estonia the average monthly salary of workers in new enterprises was found to be about 30 percent higher than the salary of workers in old enterprises. These numbers suggest that the young have bene…ted disproportionately from the creation of new private sector enterprises.
There may be several reasons why old workers are less likely than young workers to be employed in a new enterprise. One possibility is that the young are simply endowed with skills that are most demanded in the process of …rm creation. Or it may be that people have to acquire these skills, and that the cost/bene…t trade-o¤ of this investment is more favorable to the young. For example, Friedberg (2002) …nds strong evidence in support of forward-looking factors in the decision to acquire computer skills: the number of years to retirement is shown to be an important determinant, which indicates that …xed costs play a role in skill acquisition. Acquisition of the "entrepreneurial skills" that are valuable in new …rms may involve a similar element of …xed costs, which would make it less worthwhile for those with few years to retirement.
Against that background, the objective of this paper is to formalize the linkages between economic transition and intergenerational welfare redistribution. Thereby, we should be in a better position to understand why the di¤erent generational groups would, or would not, be likely to support the ongoing reform process. For that purpose we develop a model with overlapping generations (OLG) and endogenous technological change through expanding product varieties. New …rms are created as a result of investments that rely on the input of entrepreneurial skills. Thus, it is entrepreneurial activity that drives economic growth. 2 The increase in innovative capability associated with opening of the economy is modeled as an exogenous increase in household endowments of entrepreneurial skills. While we make various assumptions about which generations stand to gain from an increase in entrepreneurial possibilities, our base case re ‡ects the empirical evidence from the Baltics as alluded to above. The central point here is that it seems reasonable to assume that the young are more responsible for the surge in innovative capacity than are the old.
Our model has some similarities with the model used by Fougère and Mérette (2000) to look at issues relating to population ageing. A central di¤er-ence is that while their endogenous growth mechanism relies on human capital accumulation, ours relies on …rm creation. The process of endogenous technological change is important here for several reasons. First, it is capable of generating the large increase in growth rates that have been observed in some transition economies. In our model endowments of entrepreneurial skills constitute a small but …xed share of long-run output and a small increase in the level of these endowments may therefore have substantial e¤ects on the overall economy.
3 Second, in combination with the OLG framework, the formulation of age-dependent levels of entrepreneurial skills can capture the idea that it is the young and future generations that generate the higher output level-and receive the awards from doing so. Finally, the assumption that a long-run increase in productivity is dependent on skill sets that are only fully available among young and future generations is consistent with the fact that many transition economies have been slow to realize the high growth rates that were predicted for them.
Our analysis generates several interesting results. Overall, we …nd that an increase in entrepreneurial capacity causes not only a surge in economic activity, but also a redistribution in favor of future generations. While it is well-known that a transition to a higher income level may involve an initial period of rising inequality, we show that such a transition may in fact imply an absolute reduction in the welfare of older generations. Unless it is fully o¤set by an immediate jump in investments, an increase in entrepreneurial capacity will tend to be associated with a reduction in the unit price of entrepreneurial skills and a rise in interest rates. The current old thus su¤er from a higher relative price of consumption and experience capital losses on existing assets, but do not live long enough to gain from future increases in productivity. International capital markets are important for this outcome, as they in ‡uence the extent to which higher investments can be …nanced without a¤ecting domestic prices and interest rates. Thus, with imperfect international capital markets we …nd it possible for a majority of current generations to experience an absolute welfare loss.
4 From a political economy perspective this is an important insight, as it o¤ers a plausible explanation for the reluctance to embrace reform agendas in transition economies.
From here the paper proceeds in two main parts. Section 2 presents the model in detail, including a characterization of the steady state and an outline of the calibration method. Section 3 then o¤ers an analysis of the e¤ects of an increase in entrepreneurial capacity, including a discussion of the role of capital mobility and other kinds of sensitivity analysis. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We work with an overlapping generations model in which economic growth is due to expanding product varieties. In this model, the development of new product varieties relies on the use of entrepreneurial skills. In later sections of the paper we use the model to look at the intergenerational e¤ects of an exogenous increase in entrepreneurial skills, re ‡ecting the introduction of entrepreneur-driven capitalism that characterizes transition economies and is associated with a process of converging to a higher income level. The model is deterministic and consumers and …rms have perfect foresight, so investment decisions are determined by the time paths of future prices. Final goods are produced using intermediate inputs, are traded on world markets, and, without restrictions on the trade balance, a small open economy assumption means that the price is given from abroad. Firms producing intermediate inputs have a monopoly on their particular variety, and new …rms enter if the present value 4 Our results rely on a formulation in which households only care about their own lifetime consumption. If, alternatively, generations are altruistically linked consumption losses experienced by the old would be compensated by the gains expected for future generations. Studies of the advanced economies tend to …nd little or no evidence that such intergenerational links play an important role, see, e.g., Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ (1992, 1997) . This possibility may nevertheless play a part in explaining the willingness of older generations to su¤er the adverse distributional e¤ects of the transition process. If so, our results may be interpreted as the direct e¤ect on individual welfare excluding altruism. of markup revenue, equal to the value of the …rm, covers the cost of developing a new …rm.
Investments in …rm creation produce "blueprints" where this term should be interpreted broadly as the result of any kind of pro…t-driven activity that develops new knowledge. Examples are inventions of new products or, more generally, anything that contributes to a more productive business environment while also generating income for the developer. The number of intermediate …rms in the economy can therefore be interpreted as an index of productive knowledge. Similarly, the value of these "blueprints"-in our model equal to the market value of …rms producing intermediates-is akin to the concept of knowledge capital. The focus of this paper is …rm creation taking place within transition economies and not the mere application of inventions developed abroad. 5 We therefore assume that there is no international market for blueprints or intermediate inputs in the model. This is reasonable given the broad interpretation of a blueprint applied here, as there are important non-tradable elements in what constitutes a productive business environment. Further, it is, arguably, exactly the unleashing of the capacity to apply existing human capital more productively that best characterizes transition economies.
The production side of the model builds on the endogenous growth framework originating in Romer (1987) and subsequently developed in, e.g., Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996, ch. 6 ). An important di¤erence from the standard endogenous growth framework, however, is the presence of entrepreneurial skills as an input in the production of blueprints for new …rms. In that respect, the production side of the model is essentially the same as the one presented in Rutherford and Tarr (2002) . Entrepreneurial skills are modeled as exogenous endowments, which means that the number of intermediate …rms cannot in the long run grow faster than the …xed supply of skills. Another important di¤erence from most studies in the endogenous growth literature is that we present numerical simulations that allow us to focus on transitional effects rather than solely on analytically derived characterizations of the steady state. The demand side of the model comprises overlapping generations with perfect foresight along the lines of Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) and Altig, Auerbach, Kotliko¤, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) . We now turn to a more detailed description of each of the model's building blocks.
Consumer behavior
Final consumption arises from overlapping generations of …nitely-lived households. A household of generation j enters the economy at age 20, retires when reaching age 60, and is identi…ed by the year t in which it enters the economy. For t = 0; 1; 2; :::, each household maximizes the utility of lifetime consumption subject to the budget constraint that the present value of lifetime consumption does not exceed the present value of income:
where ½ is the utility discount rate, 1=µ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, c j;t is consumption of the …nal good, ! L j;t and ! E j;t are endowments of labor and entrepreneurial skills, ¹ f j;0 and ¹ k j;0 are the exogenously given initial holdings of knowledge capital and physical capital, and the p's are the corresponding present value prices. 6 We normalize the world market price of …nal goods to unity in future value, but domestic prices may di¤er due to changes in the exchange rate, which would then be re ‡ected in the domestic interest rate. Consequently, in present value terms, p
, where Each generation is endowed with both labor and entrepreneurial skills. For simplicity, we assume that the time pro…le of these endowments is ‡at over the life cycle. Furthermore, the aggregate labor supply is constant, so
Entrepreneurial skills, in contrast, are subject to exogenous growth, making this is the source of long-run economic development. In the baseline, each generations' endowment of entrepreneurial skills is higher than the previous generations' by a factor g so
It is against this that we compare the e¤ects of a surge in the level of entrepreneurial capacity.
Final good production
In each year t, the production of the …nal good, Y t , takes place under perfect competition using inputs of labor and di¤erentiated intermediate inputs, x i :
where
is a scaling parameter, ® is the cost share of intermediate inputs, and N t is the number of intermediate …rms at time t, which is proportional to the number of blueprints in the economy. The number of intermediate …rms is taken as given in the production decision implying that there is constant return to scale from the producer perspective, while total factor productivity is increasing with N t overall.
With symmetric …rms, each intermediate …rm produces the same quantity x i;t = x t , and the model may therefore conveniently be formulated in terms of the total number of intermediates:
; where X t = N t x t is the aggregate output of intermediates. The aggregate level of labor endowments is constant at ¹ L and total input demands are given by
where p X t is the price of intermediates, and the price of …nal goods is given by p
Intermediate goods production
Firms produce intermediate output under monopolistic competition with variable costs resulting from inputs of …nal goods and physical capital. The symmetry assumption implies that all …rms producing intermediates have the same technology, produce the same level of output, and charge the same price. Consequently, total output of intermediates may be expressed in terms of total inputs:
, r is the baseline interest rate, ± is the depreciation rate of physical capital, » is the cost share of physical capital services, K t is the stock of physical capital, and D t are material inputs to the production of intermediates. The pro…t maximizing mark-up on the unit cost of production is 1=®, so aggregate gross pro…t is ¦ t = (1 ¡ ®) p X t X t and the market price of intermediates is
where p RK t is the price of physical capital services.
In addition to the variable cost of production, …rms producing intermediates pay a …xed one-time fee for a blueprint, p F t , allowing the …rm to operate in perpetuity. The total equity of such …rms, i.e., the value of all intermediateproducing …rms, is equal to the present value of future pro…ts:
This amount, V t , may reasonably be interpreted as the knowledge capital of the economy.
Firm creation and capital accumulation
Investment takes place under perfect competition and the two types of capital accumulate according to standard convention. In the case of knowledge capital, investments require inputs of …nal goods, B t , and entrepreneurial skills, E t :
is total investment in …rm creation. We think of each new unit of knowledge capital as a blueprint with a price p F t , and normalize the number of intermediate-producing …rms to unity in the benchmark so that N t ¹ F 0 = F t meaning that the establishment of a new …rm requires ¹ F 0 blueprints. With free entry and exit among producers of intermediates, the value of knowledge capital, as expressed in (7), is on the margin equal to the cost of …rm creation so V t = p 
Here cost minimization implies
where p E t is the price of entrepreneurial skills and the return on a blueprint is the monopoly pro…t from a unit of knowledge capital so p
Investment in physical capital only involves input of …nal goods and a constant depreciation rate ± applies:
where I K t is gross investment in physical capital. Competitive behavior implies that the price of physical capital is given by
Here, to simplify the exposition, we have normalized the rental price of physical capital so p RK t =p Y t is equal to unity in the baseline, where r is the baseline interest rate. In a deterministic framework arbitrage between the two means of storing value implies that knowledge capital and physical capital earn the same rate of return measured in units of a common good.
Market clearance
Market clearance in the …nal goods market requires supply/demand balance at the aggregate level as well as consistency with individual household demand:
where P j c j;t = C t is the aggregate consumption level and S t is the trade surplus. With the small open economy assumption, the absence of restrictions on trade or international capital mobility means that p Y t is given and …xes the economy's interest rate at the rate r that applies on the world market. When the economy cannot access international credit markets the domestic interest rate is endogenous and S t = 0. (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), and (11) 
The steady state
where the g's indicate steady-state growth rates of the term in subscript. Since g F = g N by de…nition, combining these equations shows that all these growth rates are the same and equal to g, the growth rate in entrepreneurial skills. Given these growth rates, the market clearing condition (13) implies that g = g C = g S and hence we …nd that the steady-state growth rate of all components of production and consumption are exogenously given.
8
To derive the steady-state value of knowledge capital, note that (2) and a constant p X t =p Y t implies that the individual …rms' output of intermediates is constant so x t = x. From (7), and p
¡i the total present value of knowledge capital at time t is then given by
From is also constant. This means that total household income from entrepreneurial skills grows at the rate g, just as is the case for labor income. Inspection of the various price de…nitions shows that all other future-value prices are constant.
That the long-run growth rate in this model is exogenous di¤ers from the standard expanding product varieties endogenous growth framework in which long-run growth is not tied down by the level of endowments but may be a¤ected by policy. The di¤erent outcome follows from our assumption that°< 1 so that investments in …rm creation in (8) involve an input that is in …xed 8 The model exhibits the same feature if we include exogenous growth in L t . In that case g N = g as here, but the model would also involve several other (exogenous) steady-state growth rates. To keep the analysis transparent, we keep L t constant and focus on the engine of growth: e¤ective increases in entrepreneurial capacity.
supply. 9 This implies diminishing returns in …rm creation since an increase in demand for blueprints will drive up the price of entrepreneurial skills thereby ensuring that the ratio of skill endowments to the number of …rms is constant in a steady state.
10 Following Jones (1995) , we label the model as one of "semi-endogenous" growth, re ‡ecting that technological change is endogenous during a transition but exogenous in the long run.
Calibration
We calibrate the model by assuming that the economy is in an initial steady state where all production activities grow at the rate g, the trade surplus, S t , is zero, and the interest rate is constant at r. To provide an initial benchmark, we construct a baseyear (t = 0) dataset that satis…es the requirements of a steady state, and we normalize p L t and p E t to unity in the baseyear so that p
In addition, we ensure that the aggregate data is consistent with the outcome of the household maximization problem.
The characteristics of the steady state, as outlined in the previous section, provide relationships between investment levels and capital earnings that need to be satis…ed in the benchmark data. From (14), total capital income knowledge capital is
is the benchmark stock of knowledge capital with the term in the denominator correcting for di¤erences in price levels due to the fact that investments require one year to mature. From (8), the steady state assumption also requires that benchmark investments in …rm creation cover growth on the stock of …rms so that ¹ I F 0 = g ¹ F 0 . The steady-state conditions regarding the benchmark physical capital stock, ¹ K 0 , are derived in a similar way to those relating to knowledge capital except for di¤erences due to the inclusion of a depreciation term. Here we get that total income from physical capital is given by (r + ±) ¹ K 0 and that investments are given by ¹ I
9 In addition, we consider among others the case of an open economy with perfect international capital markets. In this situation the domestic interest rate is exogenous, which would tie down the steady-state growth rate also in the standard model. 10 To provide a consistent basis for the small open economy assumption we implicitly assume that the growth rate abroad also is equal to g so that the relative size of the domestic economy does not trend. The fact that the present model has g as the exogenous longrun growth rate is therefore appealing as a change in the steady-state growth rate would ultimately become inconsistent with the small open economy assumption.
To ensure that the aggregate data is consistent with the outcome of utility maximizing households, we follow the methodology laid out by Rasmussen and Rutherford (2002) , which implies calibrating the utility discount rate ½ so that
For the numerical simulations presented in the following, we adopt the parameter values presented in Table A .1., and the corresponding social accounting matrix shown in Table A. 2. This implies ½ = 0:003 and the income/consumption pro…les shown in Figure 1 , where endowment income consists of income from sale of labor and entrepreneurial skills.
11
Figure 1 about here Given the ‡at pro…le of endowment income, the model implies a constant baseline growth rate of consumption over the life cycle. Households accumulate assets during middle age and then dissave when old, as predicted by the lifecycle view of savings.
12 Since knowledge capital and physical capital earn the same net rate of return households are indi¤erent between the two types of assets. To assign values to ¹ f j;0 and ¹ k j;0 we therefore assume that all households hold the two asset types in the same proportion at all times in the initial steady state.
13
The numerical model is formulated over a 200-year horizon and solved in one-year intervals, thus capturing 40 overlapping generations at any point in time. The solution procedure involves imposing a number of terminal constraints on the model to ensure that the outcome approximates the in…nite 11 Consistency could also be achieved by setting ½ exogenously and calibrating either g or r. We choose to calibrate ½ as we view this parameter as the most uncertain. The resulting value of ½ = 0:003 is in any case similar to the value of 0.004 used in Altig, Auerbach, Kotliko¤, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) where this parameter is set exogenously. 12 The calibrated consumption growth path is somewhat steep through the lifecycle. A more realistic consumption pro…le could be obtained by imposing a more probable humpshaped pro…le for e¤ective labor endowments, as it is done in, e.g., Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) . We abstain from doing so to maintain simplicity.
horizon equilibrium path to the new steady-state equilibrium (see Rasmussen and Rutherford (2002) for details).
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Model results
Based on the rapid growth in new …rms, we think of the reform process in transition economies as closely related to the level of entrepreneurial capacity. Better opportunities for establishing and protecting property rights in these countries mean that entrepreneurs are more willing to undertake investments. Also, the greater integration into world markets that follows from market liberalization can reasonably be assumed to imply greater opportunities for dissemination of knowledge. In particular, entrepreneurs may more easily adopt foreign knowledge about how …rm creation is most e¤ectively carried out. The bottom line is that these countries have experienced a change of circumstances that have boosted …rm creation, and we capture this e¤ect in reduced form by a shock to the model that increases the overall level of entrepreneurial skills,
We then investigate the distributional consequences of how increases ! E j;t are distributed among the di¤erent generations. Table 1 about here   Table 1 shows the proportion of workers in the Baltic countries employed in enterprises established since the transition process began around 1988, as reported by Antila and Ylöstalo (1999) . Two features stand out. First, after just a single decade a very large part of the workforce is now employed in new …rms. Second, workers in new …rms tend to be young. These results are complemented by other …gures also reported by Antila and Ylöstalo, which show that average salaries in the Baltic countries are substantially higher in new enterprises than they are in the rest of the economy, and that within new enterprises younger workers earn substantially higher wages than older workers relative to what is the case in the rest of the economy. 15 Estonia, which has been the most successful of the three transition economies, also presents the most extreme example. Here, average wages in new enterprises are about 30 percent higher than the rest of the economy, and within new enterprises the under 30-year-olds earn about 30 percent more than those over 50 while the two age groups earn about the same in the rest of the economy. All this points to a clear picture of developments that have favored younger workers.
One likely explanation for these developments is that younger workers have bene…ted by having a better match with the skills that are most valuable in the new business environment. Presumably, younger workers are more inclined, and perhaps more able, to attain the set of skills-ranging from computer skills to entrepreneurship-that have become especially valuable. Even if the ability to obtain such new skills is the same, older generations have a shorter remaining life span and are therefore may be reluctant to undertake the investment in acquiring these skills. 16 While such considerations are probably true everywhere, they are especially important in transition economies where economic restructuring has suddenly introduced a wide disparity between the existing skill-base and the demands of the workplace.
To capture the relationship between the transition process, seen here as the forces accompanying an increase in …rm creation, and the advantage of being young, we use the data in the last column of Table 1 to formulate the baltic scenario. In this transition path generations who enter the economy in year 0 or anytime thereafter experience a proportional increase of their entrepreneurial endowment, ! E j;t , by¯so that E t = (1+¯) ¹ E t for t¸39. Generations with ages 21 to 30 in year 0, in contrast, experience a smaller increase of 0:80¯; those between ages 40 and 31 experience an increase of 0:62¯; those between ages 50 and 41 experience an increase of 0:46¯; and those older than 51 experience no gain at all. This implies that in year t = 10 the increase in skill endowments accruing to the di¤erent generations will be distributed in accordance with the Baltic age pro…le of workers in new …rms. As such this is a simpli…ed way of re ‡ecting the observed bene…ts of being young in a model that does not distinguish between di¤erent types of skills or labor. In our numerical calculations we investigate transition paths associated with¯= 0:1, i.e., an increase in the long-run level of entrepreneurial skills of 10 percent.
Obviously, this approach represents only one of many possible interpretations of the underlying causes for the developments summarized by the data in Table 1 . For example, the relative disadvantage experienced by the old may simply re ‡ect that uncompetitive wage setting in favor of the old is more prevalent in old enterprises. To put perspective on the importance of the speci…c details of the shock that is imposed on the model, we consider two alternative scenarios: uniform and young that bracket the range of possible allocations of skill increases between the young and the old. In the uniform scenario all generations share the same proportional increase in entrepreneurial endowments. In the young scenario only new generations, i.e., those entering the economy after year 0, bene…t. These two extreme cases would correspond to a situation where acquisition of entrepreneurial skills is entirely determined by an investment decision, and where the …xed cost of skill acquisition in one case is so small that all generations undertake the investment, while the cost in the other case is so large that only new generations do.
Since neither of the three shocks change the steady-state growth rate of E t , the resulting steady state may be compared to the baseline by noting that this is equivalent to a simple re-scaling of the units in the model so that p L t =p E t increases by¯. Consequently, all components of household income increase by the same amount and there is no change in the steady-state interest rate. Using the logic of Section 2.6 we know that all aggregate production activities, as well as p L t =p Y t , will continue to have a steady state growth rate equal to g, while p X t =p Y t and all other relative prices except those relating to p L t return to the baseline level. As a result, aggregate consumption and all output level will also increase by¯, and from (13), this implies that the trade balance will return to zero. The di¤erent shocks thus all have the same steady state impact, but, as we show in the next section, the transitional dynamics will di¤er markedly.
Transitional dynamics
When the model is exposed to a shock it will undergo a transition to a new steady state. Investments in physical capital accumulation only require inputs of …nal goods, which are traded on the world market. With no restrictions on the trade balance, the small open economy assumption means that the supply of inputs to physical capital investments is perfectly elastic. Consequently, the economy would adjust immediately to a shock that only a¤ects the physical capital stock and the interest rate would remain constant. In contrast, the shocks that we consider here involve the level of entrepreneurial capacity, which impacts on the steady-state number of …rms. Because one of the inputs to investment in …rm creation, entrepreneurial skills, is in …xed supply costminimization dictates that investments will only gradually bring the number of …rms to the new steady-state level even if the interest rate is una¤ected.
The absence of credit markets has important implications for transitional dynamics. A binding restriction on the level of the trade de…cit means that the economy cannot rely on imports to immediately adjust to a shock, but would adjust its exchange rate to match imports with exports. In such a situation, an increase in investments in …rm creation following from a shock to E t will be spread out over a number of years and the domestic interest rate changes over the transition. 18 Eventually, however, the model will reach the new steady state where the interest rate has returned to r and all relative prices, except those relating to p L t , will have returned to the initial level. Intuitively, to the extent that the increase in potential income in transition economies is related to an increase in stocks of knowledge or physical capital that are costly to build up too rapidly, it makes sense that it does not happen immediately.
Perfect capital mobility
We …rst consider a situation where there are no restrictions on the economy's ability to borrow abroad to …nance a temporary trade de…cit other than that the present value of exports must equal the present value of imports over the in…nite horizon. Figure 2 shows the impact over the …rst part of the transition following from the shock to E t . This situation implies an initial de…cit as investors exploit the opportunity to …nance part of the initial increase of investments in …rm creation on the world capital market. (2) we then get that x t = x, and we can follow the approach of Section 2.6 to conclude that p (3) grows over time at the same rate as output, Y t , where also g Yt = g Nt . The evolution in the number of …rms, N t , is consequently the driving force of the transitional dynamics. Pro…t maximization means that investments in …rm creation are carried out up to the point where the cost, as implied by (9), is equal to income as de…ned by (7). Since there is no depreciation of knowledge capital and both input and output prices of investments in …rm creation are unchanged, it follows from (8) that the level of these investments is proportional to E t .
Consider …rst the uniform scenario in which all generations bene…t from the productivity increase. Here E t = (1 +¯) ¹ E t 8 t¸0 and I F t jumps immediately to the new steady state level, i.e., an increase by¯. We can then quantify the speed of the transition by noting that the actual number of …rms, N t , is given by
which di¤ers from the steady-state level, N ¤ t , given by
De…ning the speed of transition as the rate of change in ¹ t , where
t is the fraction of the remaining di¤erence from the steady state number of …rms that vanishes in year t, we get ¹ t = (1 + g) ¡t¯= (1 +¯). In other words, the speed of the transition is constant and equal to g. With a 2 percent annual growth rate in the steady state, this means that it takes 35 years for the number of …rms to reach half of the long-run increase. In the baltic and young scenarios E t only approaches the new steady state level gradually and does not reach (1 +¯) ¹ E t until all generations in the economy are of the type that have bene…ted from the full productivity increase, which happens in year 39. Consequently, investments are initially lower and N t , and hence also p L t and Y t , take longer to reach the new steady state level.
With all prices except p L t unchanged, the continuous increase in the number of …rms means that all generations bene…t from the shock. Every generation entering the economy after year 0, as well as those of the current generations that are assumed to bene…t from higher endowment levels, experience a level increase in earnings from the sale of entrepreneurial skills. Over time each generation that lives past year 0 also experiences increasing labor income due to the rise in p L t . This produces the welfare gains shown in Panel A, where the equivalent variation ultimately levels o¤ at 10 percent corresponding to the long-run increase in household income.
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With all generations experiencing an increase in life-cycle income, the shock causes a jump in aggregate consumption, C t . Output, Y t , on the other hand, is only growing gradually at the rate g N t , which, as shown in Panel B, means a large initial trade de…cit when all generations experience the increase in entrepreneurial skill earnings, but a smaller trade de…cit when household income is increasing more gradually as is the case when only new generations experience the increase in entrepreneurial skill earnings. Subsequently, the trade balance improves as household income grows at a slower rate than output, with the ratios C t =Y t showing the inverse relationships of those appearing in Panel B. After a period with de…cits, the trade balance thus becomes positive, allowing debt incurred during the initial part of the transition to be paid back, and eventually the balance returns to zero. 19 For the initial population the reported welfare changes relate to remaining life time utility. 20 To evaluate the signi…cance of the OLG demand system, it is useful to compare these results to those arising with an Ramsey-type characterization of household demand. Assuming a single in…nitely-lived agent with an utility discount rate equal to (1 + r) = (1 + g) µ ¡ 1 and otherwise maintaining the above parameterization produces the same baseline equilibrium.
Here a 10 percent increase in this agents endowment of entrepreneurial skills results in an equivalent variation of 3.8 percent.
Imperfect capital mobility
We now consider a situation where trade is required to balance in every year, i.e., S t = 0, and Figure 3 shows the results. As shown above, the long run impact is the same as in the situation without any restrictions on the trade balance. In contrast to that situation, however, p Y t is no longer declining with a constant interest rate so all relative prices, not just those relating to p L t , are changing during the transition. Without the possibility of using international capital markets to …nance a temporary trade de…cit, the immediate increase in investments in …rm creation is smaller than before, implying a slower transition. As shown in Panel A, in the uniform scenario it takes 40 years for the number of …rms to reach half of the steady state increase, and, at the other extreme in the young scenario, the same adjustment takes almost 60 years. Now the initial increase in investments requires households to forego consumption so that C t =Y t must fall rather than increase as it did in the previous case. From Panel B we see that these ratios are in all cases initially decreasing, re ‡ecting gradually rising investment ratios. This contrasts to the situation without the restriction on the trade balance where the impact on the C t =Y t ratio was positive in the …rst part of the transition. (8) and (10) we get that
Hence, because the increase in entrepreneurial capacity is not o¤set by a correspondingly large jump in investments there is an initial reduction in p E t =p Y t , where, in each of the three scenarios, the magnitude of the initial decline re ‡ects the magnitude of the increase in E t and is less than (1+¯). In subsequent years, the decline is in all cases reversed as I F t rises. The e¤ect on income is thus positive for generations that experience the full increase in skills but negative for those who are una¤ected. The relative price of labor, p L t =p Y t , like that of entrepreneurial skills, is also lower than in the case with perfect capital mobility re ‡ecting the smaller number of intermediateproducing …rms. Consequently, total household income from these two sources is growing more slowly than before.
As shown in Panel E, the shocks have a positive impact on the interest rate, which re ‡ects the increasing demand for investments. In the young scenario the interest rate is falling for the …rst few years. This is the result of the negative e¤ect on income of the decline in p E t =p Y t for generations living in the initial years, which causes an increase in the supply of savings that more than o¤sets the e¤ect of increased investments. Inspecting (1) we note that the expression for total present value income appearing on the r.h.s. of the budget constraint may be rewritten as
This expression allows us to distinguish income changes due to the changes in future value prices from those due to changes in the interest rate. The mostly positive impact on interest rates tends to be welfare-worsening for the young who, as seen from Figure 1 , are net borrowers, while the impact is positive for the old who are net lenders.
The …nal source of income changes for generations living in year 0 is a change in p F 0 and p K 0 , i.e. changes in the value of assets held at the time of the shock. From (5) and cost minimizing behavior we get that
Substituting this expression into (2) and noting that K 0 , N 0 , and p Y 0 (the numeraire) are all unchanged from the benchmark, we get that also p X 0 and hence X 0 are unchanged. Equation (6) 
is also una¤ected by the shock. From (12) and p 
¢ 1¡°w e then get that the change in the price of knowledge capital is given by 4p
Consequently, the …rst period reduction in the price of entrepreneurial skills is followed by a somewhat smaller reduction in the price of knowledge capital. In e¤ect, a reduction in the cost of innovation causes a fall in the unit value of existing knowledge, which imposes capital losses on older generations.
The changes in incomes of the di¤erent generations are re ‡ected in the welfare changes shown in Panel F. The simulations show that in all scenarios the change in income of the oldest generation due to the reduction in p F 0 is of an order of magnitude greater than income changes due to other sources re ‡ecting that older generations bene…t little from rising wages and that the change in interest rates is small. Consequently, the oldest generation in all cases ends up with the largest welfare loss. On the other hand, the youngest generations living in year 0 all experience a welfare gain. These generations have small asset holdings, and as a result they are not much a¤ected by the decline in p F 0 and they also bene…t more by living further into the years with rising wages.
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The negative impact of capital losses is particularly great in the uniform scenario since this case also implies the greatest increase in E 0 . Here, the oldest generation experiences a welfare loss of almost 1 percent, i.e. nearly 10 percent of the long run increase in welfare, and losses apply to all households older than 49 years of age. At the other extreme, in the young scenarios (when only new generations bene…t) capital losses are smaller, but here the e¤ect on entrepreneurial skill earnings is increasingly negative so that the welfare loss is smaller initially but extends to all households older than 37. In the intermediate case based on the Baltic experience the cut-o¤ age is 46, which means that 35 percent of the initial population becomes worse o¤. Table 2 shows the implications of the productivity shock with alternative parameter values in the case with yearly trade balance restrictions. Using a lower value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1=µ, of 0.4 does not affect aggregate quantities in the baseline, but implies that households desire a higher degree of consumption smoothing. Consequently, equivalent variations decline during the transition, as households are more adverse to the changing relative prices that follow from the shock. The negative welfare e¤ect increases the share of the initial population that experiences a welfare loss. Raising the value of ® increases ¹ X t for given ¹ Y t but reduces the markup factor so the overall e¤ect on ¹ F t , and on ¹ E t via (8) and ¹ I F t = g ¹ F t , is ambiguous. With ® = 0:66 the e¤ect is positive and households thus become more exposed to the declines in p Working in the opposite direction, a larger ® means a reduction in ¹ F t = ¹ K t so that the shock to ¹ E t has a smaller impact on the interest rate, which means a smaller decline in these prices. In the case where all generations share in the full increase in skills the net e¤ect is that capital losses increase and welfare losses extend to a greater share of the population, while the reverse outcome occurs when only new generations bene…t.
Sensitivity analysis
Reducing the baseline interest rate increases the stock of total assets for given asset earnings, which in turn increases ¹ I F t and the relative importance of entrepreneurial skill earnings in total income. Consequently, initial generations experience greater capital losses due to the decline in p F 0 and the share of the initial population that becomes worse o¤ increases. Using a lower value for°means that investments in …rm creation increase faster as the relative importance of E t in (8) increases. This means a faster transition and a decline in the share of the initial population that becomes worse o¤. The remaining model parameters, g, ±, and » are found to have very little impact on the pro…le of welfare changes.
The results of the sensitivity analysis show that the parameters in the model a¤ect the welfare changes experienced by the initial population in di¤erent ways. In all the considered cases, however, older generations su¤er a welfare loss and the fraction of the initial population that becomes worse o¤ is greatest when only new generations bene…t from the productivity increase. As seen from Table 2 , the result that a signi…cant proportion of the initial population becomes worse o¤ is robust to changes in model parameters.
The assumption that all ages hold the two asset types in the same proportion along the baseline is important for the distribution of capital losses discussed in the previous section. We therefore consider an alternative parameterization in which the share of physical capital in total assets increases over the life cycle, so that the oldest generation only holds physical capital while younger cohorts hold a disproportionate share of knowledge capital. Each generation then has a short position in physical capital holdings for approximately the …rst half of the life cycle. 22 The decline in p F 0 is the major source for the welfare losses of older cohorts, so this alternative formulation reduces the welfare losses experienced by the old by shifting them to the young, which causes the proportion of the initial population that becomes worse o¤ to decline. When only new generations experience an increase in entrepreneurial skills, the alternative formulation increases initial holdings of knowledge capital of the pivotal generations around ages 30-40 in year zero, which causes an increase in the proportion of the initial population, which is adversely a¤ected.
Concluding remarks
The transition process from command to market economy in Central and Eastern European countries has been characterized not only by a rapid increase in private sector economic activity, but typically also by worsening welfare for older generations. In this paper we have presented an overlapping generations model, augmented by endogenous growth operating through expanding product varieties, which is capable of generating these two "stylized facts".
From a methodological perspective, we are not aware of any similar attempt to formalize the rise in private business formation in the context of transition economies. Indeed, the model presented in this paper is notable because a conventional approach with constant returns to scale would fail to account for the substantial increase in total factor productivity that has been experienced by most transition economies. Also, we believe that the application of overlapping generations of intertemporally optimizing households represents a novelty in the study of the transition process. More importantly, the combination of endogenous technological change and an OLG demand system within a uni…ed 22 The speci…c formula used to allocate asset holdings is here given by ¹ a = p 39 ¡ a P a ¹ m a = P a ¹ m a p 39 ¡ a, where ¹ a is the proportion of total baseline assets held as knowledge capital at age a, ¹ m a is total asset holdings by age, and¸= ¹
is the proportion of knowledge capital in total assets for the economy as a whole. A formulation that further reduces holdings of knowledge capital by the oldest generations, e.g., by replacing the square root terms in the above expression by a power greater than one half, can produce the outcome that no generations experience a welfare loss in the uniform scenario. The baltic and young scenarios result in welfare losses for some generations no matter what power is used.
analytical framework seems to capture two crucial elements of the transition process.
From a policy perspective the conclusion of the paper is quite stark. Indeed, while market reforms are widely regarded as necessary for the creation of prosperity in the medium-to-longer term, they are very likely to be voted down in a "democratic referendum". In fact, in some scenarios shown in the paper, more than half of the working age population is made worse o¤ by windfall gains from market liberalization that increase long-run consumption possibilities. This outcome is possible because an increase in the economy's capacity to generate new knowledge is likely to reduce the value of existing knowledge, which in ‡icts capital losses on the old. As a result, there is a distinct possibility that the outcome of a democratic process would be a vote against market liberalization, despite its long-run bene…ts.
23 Thus, the most likely obstacle to market reforms emerges from an intergenerational con ‡ict in objectives: older generations who bear the burden without reaping the gains are likely to oppose reform. This may also help explain the apparent reality of life in transition economies where market-oriented reforms have often been slow to be implemented. This is an interesting property of the model, not least since many observers seem to have been surprised by the fact that the transition takes so long time.
In future work we plan to extend the model in several directions. For example, while economic growth in the current version of the model is driven by entrepreneurial activity, it would be interesting to allow for endogenous skill (human capital) formation. Also, as a successful implementation of market reforms would typically require a careful balance between both inter-and intragenerational fairness, we would like to consider a model encompassing several di¤erent socioeconomic groups within each generation. 
